India and Australia, racist attacks or moral panic?

The paper ran a cartoon depicting an Australian policeman wearing a pointed white hood associated with the US racist group the Ku Klux Klan. The officer was shown saying "We are yet to ascertain the nature of the crime."

That was, apparently, the actions of a newspaper in India called the Mail Today, in response to the murder of 21-year-old Indian student Nitin Garg. When I found the site of the Mail Today to check, the first thing I'm greeted with is a pop-up asking for my feedback in response to the question "SHOULD INDIA PURSUE THE MATTER OF AUSTRALIAN RACISM IN AN INTERNATIONAL COURT?"

It worries me that the single biggest source of the claim of a dramatic increase in racist attacks against Indian people in Australia appears to be the sensationalist media, and that the same media is making calls for special action to address the claimed problem. I'm currently trawling for actual statistics of crimes, but in the absence of reliable, verifiable statistics demonstrating an upsurge in demonstrably racist violence against Indian people, and with the role that the media is playing right now, I have to wonder: is this a moral panic? Is "racist Australia" here playing the role of a folk devil perceived as threatening the virtuous and vulnerable youth of India?

I have found one claim of of a clear and dramatic increase of attacks against Indian students as reported in the Indian media: both the Mail Today and the Siasat Times claim that a "government report tabled in parliament" said that "The number of Indians attacked in Australia in 2008 was 17. In 2009, 94 Indians were attacked till November 20. A total of 100 attacks on Indians, including students, have been reported in Australia during last year". If true, that would be an extraordinary upswing.

Unfortunately I don't know what this report actually is, or how these claimed statistics were compiled. I would need that information, I think, before I could accept the figure as accurate. So....moral panic or genuine upsurge in racist violence that specifically targets Indian people? I'm not really sure at this point, although I do find it odd that Indian people, and only Indian people, would be experiencing such an upsurge. I think that believing such a situation to be possible gives Australian racism far too much credit - it's far too broad to expect it to be targeted solely at one non-white group.

The parenthood of Janet Miller-Jenkins

A case between two lesbians (one of whom now claims to be ex-gay) in America has been at the periphery of my attention the past couple of months.

I don't have time to get all the links together right now, but here's the situation as I understand it: Lisa Miller and Janet Jenkins got a civil union in Vermont. While living in Virginia, they had a child together, with Lisa conceiving through artificial insemination from an anonymous donor. Sometime later they separated. Under the terms of the dissolution of the civil union filed in Vermont by Lisa, Lisa would have custody of the child and Janet would have visitation rights. This did not happen, with Janet being refused visitation by Lisa after just one visit. Lisa then filed a new petition in Virginia requesting that the Virginia (not Vermont) court system grant Lisa exclusive access to the child, and deny any visitation rights to Janet, on the basis that same-sex marriage was illegal in Virginia, and that Janet was not really the child's parent (this in spite of the fact that the Vermont family court had ruled that she was).

The upshot: a 2006 Vermont Supreme Court ruling claiming that Vermont had exclusive jurisdiction over the issue, based on a law called (I think) the Parent Kidnapping Protection Act which explicitly prevented attempts at "jurisdiction shopping" in child custody disputes. In 2008, the Virginia Supreme Court also ruled that it was Vermont, not Virginia, that had jurisdiction. Finally, on November 20, the original Vermont judge that awarded custody to Lisa found Lisa in contempt of court and switched custody to Janet on the basis that this was the only way to ensure equal access to the child. Upon expiration of the time allotted for Lisa to give up the child, both Lisa and child vanished without trace.

Anti-gay arguments in support of Lisa's decision to go on the lam place much focus on the claim that, as biological parent, Lisa's needs should take precedence no matter what the law says. In the more extreme version of the argument, giving the child over to Janet is described by anti-gays as equivalent to forcing a mother to give her child over to the milkman.

So, I've found the 2006 Vermont Supreme Court ruling online, available here. The relevant section on the question of parenthoood, and why Janet Jenkins has it, is in paragraphs 56 to 58:

56.  Many factors are present here that support a conclusion that
  Janet is a parent, including, first and foremost, that  Janet and Lisa were
  in a valid legal union at the time of the child's birth.  The other factors
  include the following.  It was the expectation and intent of both Lisa and
  Janet that Janet would be IMJ's parent.  Janet participated in the decision
  that Lisa would be artificially inseminated to bear a child and
  participated actively in the prenatal care and birth.  Both Lisa and Janet
  treated Janet as IMJ's parent during the time they resided together, and
  Lisa identified Janet as a parent of IMJ in the dissolution petition. 
  Finally, there is no other claimant to the status of parent, and, as a
  result, a negative decision would leave IMJ with only one parent.  The
  sperm donor was anonymous and is making no claim to be IMJ's parent.  If
  Janet had been Lisa's husband, these factors would make Janet the parent of
  the child born from the artificial insemination.  See generally People v.
  Sorensen, 437 P.2d 495 (Cal. 1968).  Because of the equality of treatment
  of partners in civil unions, the same result applies to Lisa.  15 V.S.A. §
  1204.
   
       ¶  57.  Virtually all modern decisions from other jurisdictions
  support this result, although the theories vary.  See e.g., Brown v. Brown,
  125 S.W.3d 840, 844 (Ark. Ct. App. 2003) (husband estopped from denying
  child support where husband knew wife was using artificial insemination to
  have child); Sorensen, 437 P.2d at 498-500 (Cal. 1968) (husband is lawful
  father of child conceived through artificial insemination born during
  marriage to child's mother); In re Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 286-87
  (Ct. App. 1998) (finding virtually all decisions hold husband to be parent
  based on his consent to artificial insemination); In re M.J., 787 N.E.2d at
  152 (mother of children conceived through artificial insemination may seek
  to establish paternity of man with whom she had ten-year intimate
  relationship based on theories of "oral contract or promissory estoppel"); 
  Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604-05 (Ind. 1994) (husband who orally
  consented to artificial insemination of wife estopped from denying
  fatherhood of child); R.S. v. R.S., 670 P.2d 923, 929 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983)
  (husband who orally consented to artificial insemination of wife estopped
  from denying fatherhood); State ex. rel. H. v. P., 457 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492
  (App. Div. 1982) (wife estopped from denying husband's paternity where she
  fostered parent-child relationship); Brooks v. Fair, 532 N.E.2d 208, 212-13
  (Ohio Ct. App. 1988) (public policy disallows wife from denying paternity
  of husband where parties agreed during marriage to conceive via means of
  artificial insemination); In re Baby Doe, 353 S.E.2d 877, 878 (S.C. 1987)
  (husband is legal father of child where he consented to artificial
  insemination of wife during marriage); see generally A. Stephens,
  Annotation, Parental Rights of Man Who Is Not Biological or Adoptive Father
  of Child But Was Husband or Cohabitant of Mother When Child Was Conceived
  or Born, 84 A.L.R.4th 655 (1991).  Some courts find the party a parent as a
  result of contract theory or estoppel.  E.g., R.S., 670 P.2d at 928. 
  Estoppel is often invoked because of the strong reliance interests that
  arise from consensual artificial insemination.  Other courts reach the
  result more as a matter of policy, particularly stressing the adverse
  consequences of leaving the child without a parent despite the clear
  intention of the parties.  E.g., Brooks, 532 N.E.2d at 212-13.  We adopt
  the result in this case as a matter of policy, and to implement the intent
  of the parties.
   
       ¶  58.  This is not a close case under the precedents from other
  states.  Because so many factors are present in this case that allow us to
  hold that the non-biologically-related partner is the child's parent, we
  need not address which factors may be dispositive on the issue in a closer
  case.  We do note that, in accordance with the common law, the couple's
  legal union at the time of the child's birth is extremely persuasive
  evidence of joint parentage.  See People ex. rel. R.T.L., 780 P.2d 508, 515
  n.11 (Colo. 1989) ("We acknowledge that the presumption that a child born
  during wedlock is the legitimate child of the marriage was one of the
  strongest presumptions known to the common law."); Cicero v. Cicero, 395
  N.Y.S.2d 117, 117 (App. Div. 1977) (presumption of legitimacy attached to
  "issue of the marriage"); LC v. TL, 870 P.2d 374, 380 (Wyo. 1994) ("The
  presumption of legitimacy is one of the strongest in the law."); see also
  Godin, 168 Vt. at 522, 725 A.2d at 910 ("Thus, the State retains a strong
  and direct interest in ensuring that children born of a marriage do not
  suffer financially or psychologically merely because of a parent's belated
  and self serving concern over a child's biological origins."). 

Needs to be summarised for the attention-addled, obviously, but that's the argument. Unsurprisingly, most people that take Lisa's side in this dispute haven't even glanced at it.

Homosexual visibility and beyond the concept of "coming out of the closet"

The rising tolerance of the existence of homosexuality has perhaps invalidated, or at least significantly modified, the expected experience of LGBT people's lives. Homosexuality need no longer be hidden in as many social mileux as it once was, prompting academic author Steven Seidman to describe contemporary western society as gradually becoming a "post-closet society".

In his book, Seidman uses "closet" in a way that I don't often see these days: a "closeted homosexual", per Seidman, is someone who has accepted their homosexuality and engages in same-sex relations, but conceals it totally from people in their everyday, "normal" life. In my experience, most times "closet case" these days instead refers specifically to someone who still hasn't admitted their own sexuality to anyone at all, perhaps not even to themself. I find the evolution of language telling: there is less of a need for a term to describe someone who accepts their homosexuality but conceals it from everyone. Is this because such a thing is gradually ceasing to exist?

Perhaps such total concealment is getting phased out, but this is not to say that concealment is no longer necessary. In fact I think the situation now is more complicated that a binary closeted/out dichotomy can properly describe. Jon Lasser and Deborah Tharinger performed a study of LGB youth, published in the Journal of Adolescence (volume 26, issue 2, April 2003, pp 233-244), called Visibility Management in School and Beyond: A qualitative study of gay, lesbian, bisexual youth The concept of "visibility management" that they came up with seems to offer a richer understanding than that of the traditional concepts of the closet and of coming out.

Visibility management differs from coming out of the closet in several ways. First, where coming out is an event, visibility management is a proces: "While 'coming out' functions as a common expression for simple disclosure of one's sexual orientation, visibility management captures the complexity of the strategic and continuous process that GLB youth employ over time" (Lasser & Tharinger 2003, p237).

This is as much about non-verbal cues as it is about verbal announcements of one's sexuality. Dress and speech were all described by the study participants as influenced by how visible they wanted their orientation to be: "participants modify dress, speech, and body language to manage their visibility. They use subcultural symbols, euphemisms, humour and references to pop culture to manage their visibility" (Lasser & Tharinger 2003, p238)

Second, visibility management occurs on a continuum: "the extreme points of the continuum are most restrictive visibility management and least restrictive visibility management ... most participants (N=16) placed themselves between the endpoints" (Lasser & Tharinger 2003, p238). Rather than being "closeted" or "out", the youth studied had disclosed their sexual orientation to some people, but not to others. Further, and logically, they had to monitor and manage their disclosure in order to ensure that only people that they wanted to know about their sexual orientation would know about it. This of course further entailed decisions about who they wanted to know, and why.

Lasser & Tharinger didn't go into specific detail about what influenced these decisions, beyond describing it as an outcome of their interactions with their environment. This is a pity, as I think it's important, and should be a part of any more general theory of how LGBT people engage in visibility management.

Examples tI've come across in my day to day life of the kinds of pressures influencing the decisions of LGBT people about how to manage their visibility include: issues of safety, the issue of "why is it other people's business anyway?", the desire to dispel myths and fears about homosexuality by being open about it with friends and acquaintances, or simply the desire to let a potential significant other know that you swing the same way they do. There are almost certainly others, and I'd be interested in finding out what they are.

Conroy and the Australian Christian Lobby make sweet, sweet love together

Communications Minister Stephen Conroy has started the political process of spinning his upcoming report by meeting with Jim Wallace, managing director of the ACL, to discuss..something or other about the proposal which ABSOLUTELY WAS NOT any details about the upcoming report on the ISP filtering trial, shortly after which Jim Wallace said that he believed he'd "found out" enough to know that ISP-filtering would work.

Nobody else has been in any such discussions about...something or other which ABSOLUTELY IS NOT details about the upcoming report on the ISP filtering trial, particularly ISPs and free speech supporters who might be motivated to scrutinise the data a little more closely than uncritical cheerleaders like the ACL. The Greens have noticed this funny business, and would like further details. I suspect they won't get any, but it's nice that somebody is asking.

Chaid Feldblum quote in context

An openly lesbian woman is being nominated to America's Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. Predictably, the Christianist right in America is having an absolute fit. The website Good as You has already demonstrated that a video of Chai circulated by anti-gay activists has been significantly edited in a misleading way. I'm still exploring all the many claims being circulated, but I would like to put one quote back into context.
From this anti-gay website we have the claim

Feldblum has written: "Once a religious person or institution enters the stream of commerce by operating an enterprise such as a doctor's office, hospital, bookstore, hotel, treatment center, and so on, I believe the enterprise must adhere to a norm of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity." Feldblum believes that every organization must ascribe to her vision of society or else face penalties from the EEOC.

Unusually for anti-gay activists, they include a reference to the original article. It is entitled "Moral Conflict and Liberty: Gay Rights and Religion", and I find it notable just how much she stands up for the rights of religious believers in it. Of course, you wouldn't know that from reading the one small passage that anti-gay activists cherry-pick from it.

And as is quite usual for anti-gay activists, the cherry-picked quote is taken out of context and a supposed "summary" is provided which misrepresents the true meaning. Nowhere does Feldblum say that she requires "every organization" to "ascribe to her vision of society". Feldblum, in the very next paragraph of this article explicitly cites situations in which she does believe religious organisations should be allowed to discriminate against gay people.

The text of the quote, and the continuation of it that demonstrates that anti-gay activists are lying, is on pages 52 through 54 of Feldblum's article. I'm including the two paragraphs here so people can see for themselves what's going on. I'd actually recommend reading the whole thing, though, so you can get a complete picture of Feldblum's views instead of relying on anti-gay distortions.

As a general matter, once a religious person or institution enters the stream of commerce by operating an enterprise such as a doctor's office, hospital, bookstore, hotel, treatment center and so on, I believe the enterprise must adhere to a norm of non-discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and gender identity. This is essential so an individual who happens upon the enterprise is not surprised by a denial of service and/or a directive to go down the street to a different provider. While I was initially drawn to the idea of providing an exemption to those enterprises that advertise solely in very limited milieus (such as the bed & breakfast that advertises only on Christian Web sites) I became wary of such an approach as a practical matter. The touchstone needs to be, I believe, whether LGBT people would be made vulnerable in too many locations across society. An "advertising exception" seemed potentially subject to significant abuse.

Nevertheless, I believe there might be a more limited exception that would be justified. There are enterprises that are engaged in by belief communities (almost always religious belief communities) that are specifically designed to inculcate values in the next generation. These may include schools, day care centers, summer camps and tours. These enterprises are sometimes for-profit and sometimes not-for-profit. They are within the general stream of commerce, together with many other schools, day care centers, summer camps and tours.

I believe a subset of these enterprises present a compelling case for the legislature to provide and exemption in a law mandating non-discrimination based on sexual orientation. The criteria for an exemption should be as follows: the enterprise must present itself clearly and explicitly as designed to inculcate a set of beliefs; the beliefs of the enterprise must be clearly set forth as being inconsistent with a belief that homosexuality is morally neutral and the enterprise must seek to enroll only individuals who wish to be inculcated with such beliefs.

The dignity of LGBT individuals would still be harmed by excluding such enterprises from the purview of an anti-discrimination law. But in weighing the interests between the groups, I believe the harm to the enterprise in having its inculcation of values to its members significantly hampered (as I believe it would be if it was forced to comply with such a law) outweighs the harm to the excluded LGBT members.

I am more hesitant regarding the second limited circumstance, but I offer it for analysis and criticism. I believe there may be a legitimate exemption that should be provided with regard to leadership positions in enterprises that are more broadly represented in commerce. Many religious institutions operate the gamut of social services in the community, such as hospitls, gyms, adoption agencies and drug treatment centers. These enterprises are open and marketed to the general public and often receive governmental funds. It seems quite appropriate to require that the enterprises' services be delivered without regard to sexual orientation and the most employment positions and that most employment positions in these enterprises be available without regard to sexual orientation

But the balance of interests, it seems to me, shifts with regard to the leadership positions in such enterprises. Particularly for religiously-affiliated institutions, I believe it is important that people in leadership positions be able to articulate the beliefs and values of the enterprise. If the identity and practice of an openly gay person will stand in direct contradiction to those beliefs and values, it seems to me that the enterprise suffers a significant harm. Thus, in this limited circumstance, a legislature may perhaps be legitimately conclude that the harm to the enterprise will be greater than the harm to the particular individuals excluded from such positions and provided a narrow exemption from a non-discrimination mandate in employment for such positions.

Quote for the day

"Most liberal opinion is horrified by persecution of homosexuals and supports abolishing anti-homosexual laws without really accepting homosexuality as a full and satisfying form of sexual and emotional behaviour. Such tolerance of homosexuality can co-exist with considerable suspicion of and hostility towards it, and this hostility is reinforced in all sorts of ways within our society." - Dennis Altman, Homosexual Oppression and Liberation, 1972

Weird statistical reporting from Rasmussen Reports

For reasons unfathomable to me, the US public opinion poller Rasmussen Reports has decided to measure President Obama's popularity by a Presidential Approval Index rating arrived at by strange means. They get it by subtracting the percentage of those who strongly disapprove of his Presidency from those who strongly approve of it.

Why exclude moderate approval and disapproval? The current figure of -8% arrived at by Rasmussen Reports through their methodology seems to the casual viewer to suggest a negative overall view of President Obama. Yet the total numbers provided by Rasmussen in the article (50% overall approval and 49% overall disapproval) suggest a much more even split. I don't see much room here for interpreting this as Obama having negative overall popularity the way this Index misleadingly suggests. I think that there is room for interpreting this as Obama being more unpopular among rabid partisans than he is among the general population, though.

Curious also is the decision by Rasmussen to only survey likely voters to determine approval rating. As the survey summary notes, "President Obama's numbers are always several points higher in a poll of adults rather than likely voters". I can understand why this might be relevant in a poll of how people are likely to actually vote, but in general overall approval? Does being unlikely to vote automatically make your opinion completely worthless when it comes to politics? I can see how some people might argue that it should, but personally I think the principle of democratic accountability extends well beyond the single moment of an election. If people, even people unlikely to vote, have an opinion about government, then that opinion should be known and taken into account. It's a shame that Rasmussen doesn't do that.

It does seem awfully convenient that both these statistical oddities have the effect of making President Obama's approval rating seem much lower than the results reported in other surveys with more meritorious methodologies. If I was a conspiracy-oriented person I might start wondering if this was deliberate. Good thing I'm not a conspiracy-oriented person, then.